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Abstract The action abilities of an individual observer
modulate his or her perception of spatial properties of the
environment and of objects. The present study investigated
how joint action abilities shape perception. Four experi-
ments examined how the intention to lift an object with
another individual aVects perceived weight. In Experiments
1, 2a, and 2b, participants judged the perceived weight of
boxes while expecting to lift them either alone or with a co-
actor. In Experiment 3, the co-actor was healthy or injured.
Participants intending to lift a box with a co-actor perceived
the box as lighter than participants intending to lift the same
box alone, provided that the co-actor appeared healthy and
therefore capable of helping. These Wndings suggest that
anticipated eVort modulates the perception of object prop-
erties in the context of joint action. We discuss implications
for the role of action prediction and action simulation pro-
cesses in social interaction.
Introduction
How we see the world is not just a matter of physics.
Rather, cultural (Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005; Segall,
Campbell, & Herskovitz, 1966) and social (Schnall,
Harber, Stefanucci, & ProYtt, 2008; Sherif, 1935) factors,
as well as individual action abilities (Gibson, 1979; ProYtt,
2006) shape how we perceive properties of the environment
and properties of objects.
According to ecological psychology, the relation
between actors and their environment fundamentally
shapes perception (Gibson 1979; Marsh, Richardson,
Baron, & Schmidt, 2006). AVordances, deWned as objective
relations between the properties of an action system and the
properties of the environment, crucially depend on the
interaction between individuals and the environment. Thus,
a chair aVords sitting for adult humans, but climbing or hid-
ing for a small child. Although the claim that perception is
“direct” and not mediated by internal mental representa-
tions remains contested (Clark, 1997), recent research sup-
ports the claim that perception is shaped by the perceiver’s
potential for interaction with the environment.
In particular, work by ProYtt, Witt, and colleagues’ has
shown that perceivers’ action abilities aVect the perception
of spatial properties including distance, slant, and size
(ProYtt, 2006; Witt, 2011). For instance, participants
judged a hill as steeper when wearing a heavy backpack,
compared to judging it without this load (Bhalla & ProYtt,
1999). In addition to anticipated eVort (ProYtt, Stefanucci,
Banton, & Epstein, 2003; Witt, ProYtt, & Epstein, 2004),
factors shaping individuals’ perceptual judgments about
spatial layouts include the availability of tools (Witt,
ProYtt, & Epstein, 2005), and expertise in a particular
action domain (e.g., Witt & Dorsch, 2009; Witt & ProYtt,
2005). These Wndings have been explained by the assump-
tion that when people intend to perform an action, they
engage in a motor simulation of that action. Through antici-
patory motor simulation, the ability to perform the action is
determined, which inXuences the perception of spatial
properties (Witt & ProYtt, 2008).
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action capabilities is likely insuYcient for successfully
engaging in social interaction. Rather, predicting others’
actions and coordinating with them may require perceiving
aVordances for others (Ramenzoni, Riley, Davis, Shockley,
& Armstrong, 2008) as well as perceiving aVordances for
the group (Davis, Riley, Shockley, & Cummins-Sebree,
2010; Richardson et al., 2007). This may also provide the
basis for deciding whether to perform an individual action
or a joint action. For instance, Richardson et al. (2007)
found that people’s decision to lift a wooden plank together
with another person or alone systematically depended on
the ratio between plank length and the dyad’s or group’s
joint arm span. Participants with a rather long arm span
took into account the shorter arm span of their partner by
performing joint actions more frequently than predicted by
their individual arm span. These results suggest that joint
aVordances play an important role in joint action perfor-
mance.
It is unknown, however, whether joint action abilities
aVect the perception of object properties. Our action abili-
ties change drastically as we have the opportunity to act
together (Clark, 1996; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich,
2006). We can achieve things that we could not achieve
alone, and many activities are less eVortful when performed
with others, such as lifting heavy boxes together. Do joint
action abilities aVect individual perception? The present
study investigated whether the intention to engage in joint
action aVects the perception of object weight. Given the
previously demonstrated eVects of individuals’ anticipated
eVort on perception (ProYtt, 2006), we predicted that indi-
viduals intending to lift a box of potatoes (Experiment 1) or
a box of golf balls (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3) with another
person would judge the box as lighter compared to individ-
uals intending to lift the same box alone. We focused on
weight judgments rather than judgments about spatial lay-
outs because joint action clearly has an impact on this
dimension, making objects less eVortful to lift. Further-
more, previous work has shown weight judgments to be
sensitive to the social context in which individual actions
are performed (Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004; Hamil-
ton, Joyce, Flanagan, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005).
Experiment 1
This experiment investigated whether people judge boxes
Wlled with potatoes as heavier when they intend to lift them
alone, compared to intending to lift them with another per-
son. To investigate whether the perception of object weight
during actual lifting aVects judgments, we asked partici-
pants to judge the weight of the boxes not only before, but
also after lifting them alone or together. We predicted that
participants would judge the boxes as lighter not only after
joint lifting compared to individual lifting, but also while
intending to lift them jointly rather than alone. It was
ensured that participants understood they were to judge the




Forty-eight Rutgers students (mean age = 22.5 years) par-
ticipated for partial fulWllment of course requirements. Par-
ticipants were naïve with regard to the purpose of the
experiment and they were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions (solo or joint). One participant was excluded
because he was not familiar with the weight system
(pounds). All participants provided written informed con-
sent before beginning the study.
Materials and procedure
In the solo condition, participants sat on a chair in one cor-
ner of a room. In the joint condition, a second participant
sat in the opposite corner. Each participant was given a
paper and pencil to write down their weight judgments. The
instructions on the sheet read “How much does the box
weigh? Please make a judgment (between 1 and 20 lb)
before and after you have lifted it”. On each trial, a projec-
tion screen was lifted, revealing a transparent box of about
13 £ 15 £ 23 inches Wlled with potatoes. The box could
easily be grasped at the two shorter sides. Weights varied
between 1 and 20 lbs. There were 20 trials with 20 diVerent
weights. The order of weights was randomized. Participants
were instructed to judge the weight of the box, then to get
up and lift the box and then make another judgment. Partic-
ipants in the solo condition lifted the boxes alone, whereas
participants in the joint condition lifted the boxes together.
No feedback was provided.
Results and discussion
Four participants were excluded from the data analysis
because their overall accuracy was more than two standard
deviations below average. Thus, the analyses are based on
43 participants. We discarded the Wrst Wve trials as practice
trials because a Wrst inspection of the data revealed that par-
ticipants needed repeated exposure to diVerent weights in
order to calibrate. As participants knew that the actual
weight varied between 1 and 20 lbs, there was no room for
systematic biases to occur at either end of the scale; there-
fore, the statistical analyses are based on trials in which the
box weighed 3–18 lbs.123
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(ANOVA) with Condition (solo vs. joint) as a between-
subjects factor and time of judgment (before vs. after lift-
ing) as a within-subjects factor revealed a main eVect of
Condition, F (1, 41) = 5.56, p < .05, prep > .88, p2 =  .12
(Fig. 1), with joint judgments (M = 9.42, SD = 1.59) being
lighter than solo judgments (M = 10.54, SD = 1.71). This
analysis also revealed a tendency towards a main eVect of
time of judgment, F (1, 41) = 2.98, p = .09, prep = .82,
p
2
=.07,  with lower estimates after lifting (M = 9.83,
SD = 1.80) than before lifting (M = 10.15, SD = 1.67). The
interaction was not signiWcant, F (1, 41) = 0.32, p = .58,
prep = .45. Separate one-way ANOVAs for Judgments
before lifting and after lifting revealed that in both cases,
participants in the joint condition judged the weights as
lighter than in the solo condition, F (1, 41) = 4.17, p < .05,
prep > .88, p2 =.09  for before lifting, and F (1, 41) = 5.42,
p < .05, prep > .88, p2 =.12  for after lifting.
Accuracy
Participants’ pre- and post-lifting judgments in the solo
condition were highly accurate regarding the actual mean
of the weights presented (10.5 lbs). Single sample t tests
showed that mean solo judgments did not signiWcantly
diVer from the actual mean of 10.5 lbs. (p’s > .70). Interest-
ingly, participants in the joint condition signiWcantly under-
estimated the weight with regard to actual mean weight, in
both pre-lift, t(20) = ¡2.80, p = .01, and post-lift,
t(20) = ¡3.36, p = .003 judgments.
These results support our prediction that boxes appear
less heavy when one is intending to lift them with a partner
rather than alone. Judgments in the joint condition were
lower than judgments in the solo condition not only after
participants had lifted a box together, but also before they
did so. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the
experience of repeatedly lifting boxes together shaped
weight judgments in the joint condition. Thus, participants
may have judged the boxes as lighter simply because they
felt lighter on previous trials. Experiment 2a was designed
to rule out this explanation.
Experiment 2a
In this experiment, participants only made a single judgment
while intending to lift a box together or alone. Thus, they did
not experience the eVort of lifting (jointly or individually)
prior to making their judgment. Furthermore, we sought to
replicate the results of Experiment 1 with a diVerent set of
stimuli (golf balls; see Fig. 2a). Again, we predicted that par-
ticipants intending to lift the box together would judge it as
lighter than participants intending to lift it alone.
Methods
Participants
Sixteen Rutgers students (mean age = 20.75, SD = 6.65)
took part in Experiment 2a, all of whom were naïve to the
Fig. 1 Results of Experiment 1. Mean judged weight before and after lift-
ing while expecting to lift alone (solo condition) or with a co-actor (joint
condition). Error bars represent §1 standard error of the mean (SEM)
Fig. 2 Photograph of the basket of golf balls (a), and results of Exper-
iment 2a (b). Mean judged weight before and after lifting while expect-
ing to lift alone (solo condition) or with a co-actor (joint condition).
Error bars represent §1 SEM123
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one of two conditions. Eight students (5 female) partici-
pated in the joint condition, and eight diVerent students (5
female) participated in the solo condition. Students partici-
pated for partial fulWllment of a course requirement and
provided informed consent.
Materials and procedure
Participants were tested individually and sat in one corner
of the experimental room. On the Xoor approximately four
feet in front of the participant was a 2 lb. wire basket Wlled
with 18 lbs of golf balls (177 golf balls), totaling 20 lbs.
The basket remained hidden from view until all instructions
were given. The experiment consisted of a single trial. Par-
ticipants were instructed to judge the weight of the box,
then get up and lift it (either alone in the solo condition, or
with the experimenter in the joint condition), and to then
make another weight judgment. Participants were
instructed to “indicate how heavy the basket appears”. They
were told that the actual weight ranged from 15 to 25 lbs.
Participants wrote down their judgments on a sheet of paper
that was on the desk beside them. The experimenter served
as the co-actor in the joint condition for two reasons: (1) to
eliminate any diVerences in the strength of the co-actor
between participants (e.g., height, gender, or build of co-
actor) and (2) to reduce any eVect of social facilitation
(Zajonc, 1965) brought about by having an additional per-
son present in the joint condition.
Results and discussion
Figure 2b shows the results. A 2 £ 2 ANOVA with Condi-
tion (solo vs. joint) as a between-subjects factor and Time of
Judgment (before vs. after lifting) as a within-subjects factor
revealed a signiWcant interaction, F (1,14) = 4.74, p = .047,
prep = .88, p2 =.25  (Fig. 2). There was neither a main eVect
of condition nor of time of judgment (all p’s > .25). A sepa-
rate one-way ANOVA for judgments before lifting revealed
a main eVect of Condition (solo vs. joint), F (1, 14) = 5.99,
p = .028, prep = .91, p2 =.30,  where joint judgments were
lighter than solo judgments. There was no signiWcant diVer-
ence between solo and joint judgments after lifting.
Accuracy
Judgments before joint lifting were signiWcantly below the
actual mean weight of 20 lb, t(7) = ¡2.76, p = .03. Judg-
ments in all other conditions did not diVer signiWcantly
from the actual mean (all other p’s > .36, using single sam-
ple t tests).
These Wndings conWrm our prediction. Even in the absence
of the experience of joint lifting, participants expecting to lift
a basket of golf balls with another person judged it as lighter
than those expecting to lift it alone. Unlike in Experiment 1,
judgments after lifting did not signiWcantly diVer between the
solo and joint condition. It could be that the diVerence
between the solo and joint condition after lifting in Experi-
ment 1 reXects an eVect of repeated lifting. In particular,
repeated lifting may have led participants in the joint condi-
tion to perceive the boxes as not so heavy, whereas partici-
pants in the solo condition might have suVered from fatigue.
This eVect did not occur in the present experiment, where par-
ticipants only lifted the box a single time. In fact, judgments
after lifting were surprisingly accurate. They were slightly
higher, though not signiWcantly diVerent from the actual
weight. In contrast, judgments before lifting were slightly too
high in the solo condition, and signiWcantly too low in the
joint condition. Taken together with the results of Experiment
1, it appears that solo judgments are generally more accurate,
whereas judgments in the joint condition reXect a tendency to
underestimate the actual weight.
A possible explanation for this underestimation is that par-
ticipants intending to act together engaged in motor simula-
tion of their part of the joint action to be performed. Predictive
forward models (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001) based on prior
experience in jointly lifting boxes could have yielded predic-
tions about the eVort required to lift the box together. Antici-
pated eVort, in turn, may have aVected weight judgments.
However, an alternative explanation is that participants’ judg-
ments simply reXect a cognitive bias whereby a particular
social context leads to the underestimation of quantities.
Experiment 2b was designed to rule out this possibility.
Experiment 2b
If the eVects observed in Experiments 1 and 2a were due to
cognitive bias, then judgments about other properties, such
as quantity (i.e., the number of golf balls in the basket),
should be similarly aVected by the joint action context. If,
on the other hand, the observed underestimation of box
weight in the joint condition reXected eVects of anticipated
eVort on perception, then judgments about quantity should
not be aVected by whether participants are intending to lift
a box alone or together. Motor eVort, per se, reXects weight,
and not quantity. Thus, only weight judgments should be
inXuenced as a direct eVect of anticipated eVort.
Methods
Participants
Twenty Rutgers students (mean age = 19.9, SD = 1.68)
took part in Experiment 2b, all of whom were naïve to the
purpose of the experiment and randomly assigned to one of123
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joint condition, and 10 diVerent students (4 female) partici-
pated in the individual condition. Students participated for
partial fulWllment of a course requirement and provided
informed consent.
Materials and procedure
The same materials and procedure were used in Experiment
2b as in Experiment 2a, except for an additional request to
estimate the number of golf balls in the basket. Prior to
making judgments about the box’s weight, participants
were asked to “indicate how many golf balls are in the bas-
ket”. All other instructions remained identical to those of
Experiment 2a. Consistent with the constraint on the range
of possible weights (§25%), participants were told that the
actual number of golf balls ranged from 135 to 225.
Results and discussion
Weight judgments
Figure 3 shows the results. A 2 £ 2 ANOVA with Condi-
tion (solo vs. joint) as a between-subjects factor and Time
of Judgment (before vs. after lifting) as a within-subjects
factor revealed a main eVect of Time of Judgment, F (1,
18) = 7.22, p = .015, prep = .94 p2 =.29  (Fig. 3). There was
no main eVect of condition and no interaction (p’s > .33). A
separate one-way ANOVA for Judgments before lifting
revealed a signiWcant eVect of Condition, F (1,18) = 4.59,
p = .046, prep = .88, p2 =.20  (equal variances not
assumed), where Solo judgments were heavier than joint
judgments. This seems to be the driving factor behind the
main eVect of time of judgment reported above.
Accuracy
As in Experiments 1 and 2a, single sample t tests showed that
post-lift judgments (p’s > .10) did not diVer signiWcantly from
the mean actual weight. However, pre-lift judgments in both
the individual, t(9) = ¡2.33, p = .045, and Joint conditions,
t(9) = ¡3.36, p = .008, were lower than the actual weight.
Number judgments
Mean judgments of the number of golf balls before lifting
were 155.3 (SD = 16.50) in the joint condition, and 161.8
(SD = 20.17) in the solo condition. Mean judgments after
lifting were 168.1 (SD = 31.17) in the joint condition, and
166 (SD = 31.43) in the solo condition. A 2 £ 2 ANOVA
with condition (solo vs. joint) as a between-subjects factor
and time of judgment (before vs. after lifting) as a within-
subjects factor revealed neither a main eVect of Condition,
Time of Judgment, nor a signiWcant interaction, all
p’s > .10. A one-way ANOVA comparing pre-lift judg-
ments in the individual versus joint conditions revealed no
signiWcant diVerence, F (1, 18) = .622, p = .44. There were
no signiWcant correlations between individual participants’
weight judgments and number judgments.
As predicted, weight judgments were aVected by the
intention to lift alone or together while number judgments
were not. This indicates that anticipated eVort rather than a
cognitive bias underlies the underestimation of object
weight when intending to lift objects together.
Lower weight judgments before joint lifting were
observed consistently across Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b (as
evidenced by the signiWcant main eVect of Condition for
judgments given before lifting). In contrast, the pattern of
post-lifting judgments varied across experiments. In Exper-
iment 1, judgments after lifting showed the same pattern as
judgments before lifting, whereas in Experiments 2a and 2b
there was no diVerence in weight judgments after joint or
individual lifting. This can be explained by the fact that
Experiments 2a and 2b only involved a single trial, so that
the eVort associated with repeated lifting of the box did not
aVect post-lifting judgments. Finally, whereas in Experi-
ment 2a estimates in the solo condition decreased after lift-
ing the box and estimates in the joint condition increased,
in Experiment 2b, they increased in both conditions. This
may be due to the fact that participants’ initial judgments in
Experiment 2b tended to be too low in both conditions, so
that lifting the box led to upward corrections.
Experiment 3
What could be the mechanism underlying the observed
eVect of intended joint action on weight judgments? The
Fig. 3 Results of Experiment 2b. Mean judged weight before and after
lifting while expecting to lift alone (solo condition) or with a co-actor
(joint condition). Error bars represent §1 SEM123
472 Psychological Research (2012) 76:467–475results of Experiment 2b provide some evidence that antici-
pated eVort rather than a general cognitive bias led to the
observed modulation of weight judgments. If this is true,
then participants’ weight judgments should be modulated
by the physical ability of their co-actor, such that weight
judgments decrease more if the co-actor is perfectly able to
lift the box compared to when the co-actor is limited in his
or her ability to lift the box. However, it could also be that
sharing the intention to perform a joint action is key. Rather
than the anticipated physical eVort, the knowledge that one
is intending to act together upon an object may change
one’s perception of it. In particular, a study by Schnall et al.
(2008) indicates that social support has similar eVects as
raising one’s individual action abilities. When participants
thought about a supportive other, a hill seemed less steep to
them compared to when they thought about an unfriendly
person. In our experiments, having a shared intention (Brat-
man, 1992; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll,
2005) or a shared goal (ButterWll, 2011), or experiencing
joint commitment (Gilbert, 1999; Gräfenhain, Behne, Car-
penter, & Tomasello, 2009), may have created a feeling of
social support that made the boxes in Experiments 1 and 2
appear lighter in the context of joint action.
To test these alternative explanations, we manipulated the
co-actor’s perceived physical ability. In the joint condition,
half of the participants were paired with an apparently
injured co-actor, and half with a healthy co-actor (Fig. 4; the
co-actor in all conditions was also the experimenter). To
rule out eVects of exposure to an injured individual, the
same experimenter was present in the solo condition and
appeared injured or not. Thus, there were four between-sub-
jects conditions: joint-healthy (participants expecting to lift
with a physically healthy partner), solo-healthy (participants
expecting to lift alone, with the healthy person present in the
room), joint-injured (participants expecting to lift with an
injured partner), and solo-injured (participants expecting to
lift alone, with the injured person present in the room).
If anticipated eVort plays a role in the observed eVects on
weight judgments, participants intending to lift a box with
an uninjured co-actor should judge it as lighter than partici-
pants intending to lift it with an injured co-actor. Weight
judgments in the solo condition should be the same regard-
less of whether an injured or healthy person is present.
Alternatively, if having a shared intention or a shared goal
is critical, judgments in the two joint conditions should be
the same, because in both cases, participants are intending
to act together with another person. In this case, one would




Forty-Wve Rutgers students (mean age = 19.38, SD = 1.54;
19 female) participated for partial fulWllment of a course
requirement. All were naïve to the purpose of the experi-
ment and were randomly assigned to one of four condi-
tions. Two participants were excluded because they
misunderstood the instructions.
Fig. 4 Experimenter who 
served as co-actor in healthy 
state (a) and injured state (b)123
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The same materials and procedure were used as in Experi-
ment 2a. The only diVerence was the additional manipula-
tion of the co-actor’s apparent physical ability (injured vs.
healthy). In the injured conditions, the experimenter (acting
as the lifting partner in the joint condition) wore a CVS
Pharmacy brand Adult Arm Sling on his dominant (right)
arm and a Futuro Brand Soft Cervical Collar around his
neck (Fig. 3). To ensure participants knew the dominant
arm was injured, and to reinforce the believability of the
injury, the experimenter asked participants with help in Wll-
ing out their own data sheet (i.e., writing down their gender
and age). If asked about the cause of the injury, the experi-
menter replied he had been in a minor car accident the pre-
vious weekend. After the experiment, participants were
debriefed and questioned regarding the believability of the
injury. Two participants expressed doubts about the injury;
therefore, their data were excluded. All others indicated
they thought the injury was real, which was further evi-
denced by the look of surprise and laughter after Wnding out
the truth. It may be noted that the injury was so believable
that one participant, after having been made fully aware
that the injury was fake, still said upon leaving “Hope you
feel better”.
Results and discussion
One participant was excluded from data analysis because
her judgment prior to lifting was more than two standard
deviations outside of the group mean. Thus, the analyses
are based on data from 40 participants.
Weight judgments
Figure 5 shows the results. A one-way ANOVA revealed a
signiWcant main eVect of condition, F (3,36) = 2.97,
p = .045, prep = .89, p2 =.20.  As we had a priori expecta-
tions regarding the qualitative relationship between condi-
tions, we next ran a planned contrasts analysis with the
contrast coeYcient of the joint-healthy condition set at ¡3
and the other 3 conditions set at 1. This analysis showed
that participants in the joint-healthy condition provided sig-
niWcantly lower judgments, t(3,36) = 2.95, p = .006, than
participants in the solo-healthy, solo-injured, and joint-injured
conditions. A one-way ANOVA for post-lift judgments
revealed no signiWcant diVerences between conditions,
F (3,36) = 1.43, p = .25.
Accuracy
Regarding pre-lift judgments, single-sample t tests with 20
as the test value showed that judgments in three conditions
were signiWcantly lower than the actual weight of 20 lbs:
joint-healthy [t(9) = ¡8.43, p < .001; M = 16.40, SD = 1.35],
solo-healthy [t(9) = ¡4.02, p = .003; M = 18.30, SD =
1.34], and solo-injured [t(9) = ¡2.24, p = .05; M = 18.50,
SD = 2.12]. In single sample t tests with 20 as the test
value, the only post-lift condition that signiWcantly diVered
from the actual weight (was signiWcantly lower) was joint-
healthy t(9) = ¡2.91, p = .02; (M = 17.50, SD = 2.72).
These results show that intending to lift with another
person makes the load look lighter, but only when intend-
ing to lift with a healthy person who is capable of providing
a signiWcant amount of help. Intending to lift with a seem-
ingly injured individual (i.e. someone in an arm-sling and
neck-brace) did not aVect participants’ perception of weight
in a similar fashion as intending to lift with a healthy indi-
vidual. An increased feeling of social support through
shared intentions in the joint condition cannot explain the
observed eVects. Rather, it seems likely that participants
judged boxes as less heavy because they anticipated the
eVort during joint lifting.
Fig. 5 Results of Experiment 3. Mean perceived weight of a 20 lb bas-
ket while expecting to lift alone (solo condition) or with a co-actor
(joint condition) (a), or after lifting (b). The physical state of the other
person could be healthy or injured. Error bars represent§1 SEM123
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The set of experiments presented here examined how one’s
resources in combination with the resources of others can
modulate perception. Three experiments showed that
intending to lift a box together decreases judgments of its
weight compared to intending to lift the same box alone,
provided that the co-actor appears capable of helping. This
indicates that perception is shaped not only by what we can
do by ourselves but by what we can do with others.
Our Wndings extend earlier studies that have investigated
how individual action abilities aVect the perception of the
environment and of object properties. These studies have
consistently found that individual ability, be it determined
by expertise, the availability of tools, or current Wtness lev-
els, aVects how individuals judge distances to be covered,
slants to be mastered, and the size and movement speed of
objects to be manipulated (for review, see ProYtt, 2006;
Witt, 2011). The present Wndings indicate that the percep-
tion of object properties also reXects changes in individual
ability brought about by interpersonal coordination. It
remains to be investigated whether joint action abilities
modulate the perception of other properties apart from
object weight, such as distance.
How does intending to act together shape weight judg-
ments? This could take several forms. On the one hand, one
could assume that the joint aVordance of boxes to be lifted
together directly aVects weight perception. The notion of
joint aVordance suggests that co-actors perceive the environ-
ment in terms of what they can do together. For instance, an
object might aVord joint lifting given its length and the com-
bined arm span of the dyad (Richardson et al., 2007), or a
doorframe might aVord walking through side by side given
two people’s combined shoulder width (Davis, Riley,
Shockley, & Cummins-Sebree, 2010). One could argue that
in our experiments, boxes aVorded joint lifting given the
presence of a healthy co-actor, and that this directly changed
the perception of their weight. It is also possible that partici-
pants perceived something like ‘lift-ability’ rather than
weight so that the information they used to make the weight
judgments was not information about weight per se.
On the other hand, it seems possible that participants
simulated the action they intended to perform, relying on
their own motor system (Cross et al., 2009). It has been
proposed that internal simulation involves predictive mech-
anisms that generate predictions about the sensory conse-
quences of actions (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Such
internal models can be used not only to generate predictions
about one’s own actions (e.g., Blakemore, Frith, & Wol-
pert, 1999) or about perceived actions (Parkinson, Springer,
& Prinz, 2011; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003; Wilson &
Knoblich, 2005) but can also be used to predict the out-
comes of jointly performed actions (Sebanz & Knoblich,
2009). It has been demonstrated that the motor system is
sensitive to the eVort required to lift an object (Alaerts, de
Beukelaar, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2011). Accordingly,
the anticipated eVort derived from anticipatory motor simu-
lation (Kilner et al., 2004) could have biased weight judg-
ments. An interesting prediction that follows from this
account is that seeing objects being lifted by two people
should also make them look lighter compared to objects
that are being lifted by a single person.
Finally, although the accuracy of the weight judgments
varied somewhat across the three experiments, it is note-
worthy that people tended to be less accurate in the joint
action context, consistently underestimating the weight of
the boxes to be lifted together. This is consistent with a
view where our perceptual system is optimized for guiding
our interactions with the environment rather than deriving
action-independent object properties. In a context where
engaging in joint action is a possibility, it may be highly
useful to be able to anticipate common eVects in order to
decide when and with whom to collaborate. In fact, one
could speculate that eVects of anticipated joint action on
perception might act as a driving force for collaboration.
While this remains to be explored, the Wndings reported in
this study lead us to conclude that the joint action abilities
of a group shape the individual perception of its members.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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